#The man in the arena trial
Some details have already been revealed in the inquiry proceedings and in the trial of Hashem Abedi, the younger brother of the bomber, now serving life in jail for helping build the bomb. They argue that it is only by understanding the scale of the failings at MI5 that they can be sure that lessons have been learned.
The families of the victims certainly wanted to know and Sir John apologised to them in the report, saying his decision to withhold information on national security grounds was ‘particularly difficult for the bereaved families’. The question remained, however, what was the information? What activity that was ‘highly relevant to the planned attack’ was taking place in the months before the attack and why might that be mistaken for possible criminal activity? It shows the problems with taking ‘corporate’ witness statements during inquiries without questioning the individuals who made the decisions, something Sir John was keen to correct. Unless the five officers who spoke in the closed hearings changed their story, that does not appear to have been the real position. It can be difficult to distinguish, for example drug dealing and fraud from national security activity.’ ‘The challenge for us is when individuals are involved in terrorism and crime, some of their behaviour and activity can look the same. Why does the census say there are more trans people in Newham than Brighton? ‘We assess that Salman Abedi was part of a group of individuals in South Manchester who had links to a serious crime gang.’ ‘There is at least the material possibility that opportunities to intervene were missed’, Sir John said.ĭuring two days of open hearings, the Manchester Arena Inquiry heard from MI5’s director-general for counter-terrorism, referred to only as Witness J. No timescale was provided for when the MI5 officer’s report was delivered but the chairman said it was too late to stop Salman Abedi when he returned, four days before the bombing.Īt that point, Abedi was probably carrying the switch he used to set off his bomb, which he brought back from Libya. Had he been followed on his return, MI5 could have seen him visiting a Nissan Micra which was parked up at a block of flats in South Manchester and contained his stash of bomb-making chemicals. Had ‘further investigative action’ been taken, it could have given rise to information which meant that when Salman Abedi returned to Manchester after a month in Libya, he would have been treated ‘extremely seriously’ by MI5. The second piece of intelligence ‘gave rise to the real possibility of obtaining information that might have led to actions which prevented the attack’, Sir John said. Nevertheless, a report that should have been written on the same day was not delivered and when it was, it did not contain ‘sufficient context’. When Sir John questioned three officers in person, during ten days of closed hearings, they told him they realised at the time that the second piece of intelligence related to ‘activity of pressing national security concern’. However, Sir John said: ‘Having heard from those witnesses who handled, I do not consider that these statements present an accurate picture.’ Only in ‘retrospect’ did they discover the intelligence was ‘highly relevant to the planned attack’ although ‘the significance of it was not fully appreciated at the time’, they said.Īnother question that remains at the end of the inquiry is whether the sale of hydrogen peroxide is even necessary
MI5 had told Lord Anderson, who examined their own internal review, that the officers analysing the intelligence took it to be ‘criminal activity’, possibly connected to drug dealing or organised crime. The chairman said there was a ‘realistic possibility’ that ‘actionable intelligence’ could have been obtained which might have led to preventing the attack that killed 22 people in May 2017. Key among them are the two ‘pieces of intelligence’ that MI5 learned in the months before the bombing and why they didn’t they act on them. Despite the thoroughness with which the chairman approached his task, it does leave unanswered questions. The report gave us a glimpse into the decision-making of MI5, but only a glimpse. ‘I did ask the questions, I did get answers, but for the reasons I have given I have not been able to report publicly what those answers were,’ he added. ‘I know that what I have revealed, while increasing public knowledge, will raise other questions that I have not been able to answer,’ Sir John Saunders said, in issuing his final report into the Manchester Arena bombing.
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